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HERBERT STEIN, COMMIITEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The papers published in this volume were presented at two con-
ferences held in Princeton, New Jersey—the first on October 30—Si,
1953,and the second on May 14—15, 1954.
The purpose of the conferences was to survey the existing state
of readiness to deal with the problem of depression, in terms both
of understanding the problem and of the availability of instruments
to deal with it. The conferences were not called in the expectation
that the United States was about to encounter a major depression,
although there was a feeling, in early 1953, that we were entering a
period of increased vulnerability to an economic decline.
There were two main reasons why the conferences were called
when they were. First, there had been a number of important devel-
opments in the economy in the preceding fifteen years or so which
would affect its ability to resist a depression. The change in the size
and character of the federal budget and the alterations in the bank-
ing structure are outstanding examples. While these developments
were widely recognized, attempts to assess their significance had been
fragmentary. It seemed timely to try to obtain a more systematic
quantitative appraisal of their importance. Second, the depression
problem had slipped far from the center of attention it formerly held
in the work of economists. This was natural and, to some extent, a
move in the direction of better balance. But there was a possibility
that the appeal of more fashionable subjects was causing undue
neglect of still-vital problems. It seemed desirable to see whether
aspects of the depression problem would emerge which deserved
more attention than they were getting.
Even in four days of conference it was not possible to cover all
phases of antidepression policy. The selection of subjects reflects, in
part, the planning committee's estimate of relative importance. But
this was not the whole explanation of the selection. One area—the
contribution of private business—was excluded because it had been
thoroughly discussed in a recent Universities—National Bureau Con-
ference on Regularization of Business Investment. In one or two
cases the choice of subjects was influenced by the possibility of getting
constructive papers written in the time available.
I shall not attempt here to summarize the papers or to deduce their
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net conclusion about our ability to deal with the depression prob-
lem. There are, however, a few observations that should be made
to place the papers in perspective.
For the past twenty years or so the question of what causes busi-
ness depressions has seemed not to be importantly involved in the
question of how to prevent, check, or correct depressions. "Raise
total money spending" was all we needed to know; the cause and
specific location of the deficiency in spending did not matter. Now
both Mr. Gordon's paper and Mr. Boulding's paper present the pos-
sibility that depressions differ in specific causes and in other respects
in ways that call for different policies to deal with them. This view
certainly has great appeal. Its acceptance, however, requires us to
face two problems. First, we must learn what measures are appro-
priate to each of many possible kinds of depressions. Second, we must
learnto identify the kind of depression we confront in time to select
the appropriate policy. On the first point the Cordon and Boulding
papers are highly suggestive, but their authors would probably not
regard them as definitive. On the second point neither the papers
nor the discussion are encouraging.
If we must be able to detect specific economic imbalances or de-
ficiencies in order to deal with the depression problem satisfactorily,
we probably have a long way to go. But this may imply too stringent
a standard of what is satisfactory. We may be able to improve greatly
on our past record in combating depressions without knowing a
great many things that we should ideally know.
Mr. Roosa's paper on monetary policy deals with an aspect of the
problem of detecting and responding to specific qualitative features.
of business declines. Is it sufficient to say that we will ease bank re-
serves when business is too low and tighten them when busines is too
high? Or is the specific point in the capital markets where reserves
are injected or withdrawn a matter of primary or at least important
concern?
Somewhat similar questions about what we need to know are
raised by Mr. CaplEan's paper on the recession of 1948—1950. There
were, and still are, apparently substantial differences of opinion
about what was going on in the economy at that time. There were
disagreements about whether we were going to have a recession,
whether it would be deep or long, what might be responsible for it.
We know from subsequent revisions that many of the statistical series
studied at the time were seriously in error.
Nevertheless the policy followed seems to have been about right.
How can this be explained, and, more important, can we count on
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a repetition of this fortunate outcome? Was it justluck? Did the
policy reflect an equilibrium between budget balancers and tax
cutters, between all-outers and stand-patters—and is that equilibrium
likely to persist? Or is it sufficient for most practical purposes to be
able to make certain gross distinctions about the economic situation
—as between rampant inflation and reasonable stability or between
moderate recession and deep depression?
The papers by Miss Merriam and by Messrs Lusher, Cohn, Fox,
Heer, Goode, and Pechman are important contributions to the evalua-
tion of various aspects of the built-in flexibility of government finance.
From this portion of the conference's work we can get good estimates
of what may be called the first-round effects—the extent to which
government receipts, expenditures, or deficits will be influenced by
certain assumed changes in income or employment. This brings us
to the borders of another problem, namely, How will the, economy
respond to the operation of the built-in stabilizers? The Lusher and
Fox papers make some approach to answering this question, in addi-
tion to measuring the first-round effects.
To make progress in appraising the built-in stabilizers we must
test them—on paper—in a variety of models of possible economic
declines. The effectiveness of the stabilizers will depend upon the
relative weight of autonomous initiating factors and of multiplying
factors in the decline as well as upon other specific features of the
situation. This is not a matter only of the extent to which the decline
will be cushioned by built-in stabilizers. In some models of economic
declines the built-in stabilizers will stop a decline and initiate an
upturn.
The development of realistic models of cyclical responses is, of
course, a difficult task and one that is receiving much attention. I
wish to point out only that appraisal of the strength of built-in stabi-
lizers depends upon fairly specific assumptions about the response
pattern, even when the first-round effects are known.
At many points in this volume we are evaluating as antidepression
instruments programs that have important objectives other than
preventing depressions. This is conspicuously true of the papers on
public works, housing, international commodity programs, and in-
ternational monetary arrangements by Messrs. Owens, Grebler, John-
son, and Triffin. This volume can present only part of the evidence
that is needed for policy judgments on these matters.
In a broader sense, a conference on antidepression policy deals
with an abstraction. We want not merely to prevent depressions but
to do so while doing certain things about economic efficiency, ceo-
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nomic growth, price levels, economic freedom, and other objectives.
The limitations that these other objectives might impose on anti-
depression policy were not much discussed at the conferences, per-
haps because there is so much implicit agreement to accept these
limitations. But the question would undoubtedly have been more
prominent if the conferences had tried to arrive at a Program for
Action.
Our authors were given a relatively short time for preparing the
papers contained herein. On behalf of the planning committee I
wish to thank the authors and discussants for their cooperation
throughout. I also wish to express our thanks to Messrs. Charles T.
Broderick, Grover W. Ensley, and Irwin Friend, who participated
in a panel discussion, not reproduced here, on signals for action to
prevent depression. Also distributed to members of the conference
were selected portions of two studies under way at the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research—John Firestone's "Cyclical Behavior of
Federal Receipts and Expenditures, 1879—1949" (mimeographed,
NBER, 1955), and Daniel Creamer's Personal Income during Busi-
ness Cycles (Princeton University Press for NBER, 1956).
The services of Mr. Daniel M. Holland of the National Bureau in
organizing the meetings and guiding the production of this volume
were invaluable. Members of the National Bureau's editorial staff
performed the indispensable tasks of bringing order and finally
print out of a welter of manuscript.
Mr. Donald H. Wallace served as chairman of the planning com-
mittee for the conferences until his death on September 19, 1953. In
this project, as he had in many others, he displayed that competence
and generosity that so endeared him to all his colleagues.
The other members of the planning committee were:
Lester Chandler
Cerhard Coim





I am grateful to them all for guidance and support.
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